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REINING IN THE SUPERLEGISLATURE: A
RESPONSE TO PROFESSORS CARRINGTON
AND CRAMTON
Danielj Meadort
Unlike a traditional court of law in the Anglo-American legal
world, the United States Supreme Court chooses the cases and issues
it will decide. It selects them from the many thousands of petitions
presented to it annually, declining to decide all but a tiny percentage.
The Court is obliged to decide none. In fact, it currently provides
review in fewer than seventy cases each year, half as many as it re-
viewed three decades ago. Professors Paul Carrington and Roger
Cramton, in a wide-ranging survey of the federal judiciary's transfor-
mation, see the Court's unlimited discretion as having converted it
into a "superlegislature." This development has given rise to public
clamor for political accountability of the Justices, as though they were
legislators, threatening the kind of judicial independence essential to
a regime of law. They have put forward a bold proposal to pull the
Court back toward a law court model by sharply curtailing its discre-
tionary choice of business and providing it with a large measure of
mandatory jurisdiction.1 In this Response, I critique their proposal.
I
First, a bit of background and disclosure. The federal judiciary's
transformation began in the late 1960s. The cause of almost all
changes at all levels since then has been the huge, unrelenting growth
in litigation. The impact of this growth was first felt most acutely at
the intermediate appellate level. There were two threats: erosion in
the integrity of the appellate process and lack of uniformity in na-
tional decisional law. The initial response to those concerns came
from the American Bar Foundation in its 1968 report entitled Accom-
modating the Workload of the United States Courts of Appeals.2 Professor
Carrington served as director of that study, and he followed it up with
an influential law review article.
3
t James Monroe Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Virginia School of Law.
I Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, Judicial Independence In Excess: Reviving the
Judicial Duty of the Supreme Court, 94 CORNELL L. REv. 587 (2009).
2 AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, ACCOMMODATING THE WORKLOAD OF THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS (1968).
3 Paul D. Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the Func-
tion of Review and the National Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 542 (1969).
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With concerns growing over those matters, the Federal Judicial
Center and the National Center for State Courts in 1971 jointly estab-
lished the Advisory Council for Appellate Justice. Its mission was to
advise those two centers on the appellate challenges of the day. The
Council, chaired by the late Professor Maurice Rosenberg, consisted
of some of the country's ablest appellate judges, lawyers, and law
professors. Professors Carrington and Cramton were members, and it
was my privilege to serve with them on that body. Its work culminated
in the 1975 National Conference on Appellate Justice. 4 In the
meantime, Congress, with increasing concern about the capacity of
the intermediate courts to manage the rising case volume, created the
Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System
(Hruska Commission). Professor Cramton was a member. It submit-
ted reports in 1973 and 1975.
5
'Over the four decades since those early years of the "crisis of vol-
ume ''6 there have been numerous congressional hearings, confer-
ences, law review articles, and studies addressing the federal
intermediate courts.7 Throughout, Professors Carrington and Cram-
ton have been involved in those efforts and have been among a small
group of legal academics who have constantly sought (without much
success) to preserve the essential role of the appellate courts and to
achieve nationwide uniformity in federal decisional law. Over these
many years I have labored with them in these appellate vineyards in
various ways and on numerous occasions. Thus I bring to this critique
of their latest effort a long familiarity with and admiration for their
work, as well as a presumption that their ideas for judicial reform are
entitled to serious consideration.
4 On Behalf of the Advisory Council, Professor Carrington prepared four volumes of
reading material distributed in advance to all conferees. A fifth volume included the con-
ference proceedings. ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR APPELLATE JUSTICE, APPELLATE JUSTICE: 1975.
Earlier the council issued two reports. ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR APPELLATE JUSTICE, EXPEDIT-
ING REVIEW OF FELONY CONVICTIONS AFTER TRIAL (1973); ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR APPELLATE
JUSTICE, STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION OF JUDICIAL OPINIONS (1973). Council members
served as advisors for the first study conducted on the use of appellate staff counsel and
truncated internal processes. See DANIELJ. MEADOR, APPELLATE COURTS: STAFF AND PROCESS
IN THE CRISIS OF VOLUME (1974).
5 COMM'N ON REVISION OF THE FED. COURT APPELLATE SYS., THE GEOGRAPHICAL
BOUNDARIES OF THE SEVERAL JUDICIAL CIRCUITS: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE (1973);
COMM'N ON REVISION OF THE FED. COURT APPELLATE SYS., STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL PROCE-
DURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE (1975).
6 This phrase was used to describe the unprecedented rise in appellate filings. See
MEADOR, supra note 4.
7 Much of the activity concerning federal judicial reform in the 1970s and 1980s is
described in Daniel J. Meador, The Federal Judiciary-nflation, Malfunction, and a Proposed
Course of Action, 1981 BYU L. REv. 617. Among the later studies were COMM. ON LONG
RANGE PLANNING JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE
FEDERAL COURTS (1995); COMM'N ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR T1-E FED. COURTS OF
APPEALS, FINAL REPORT (1998); REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE (1990).
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II
Their current proposal is reminiscent of, though different from,
an earlier effort addressed to the Supreme Court's certiorari jurisdic-
tion. That effort came in the midst of the flurry of activity just men-
tioned from 1968 to 1975. It was launched, by the Federal Judicial
Center, by creating the Study Group on the Caseload of the Supreme
Court (Freund Committee).8 That committee addressed the burden
placed on the Supreme Court Justices in reviewing several thousand
certiorari petitions annually to determine which to grant. In its re-
port, submitted in 1972, the Committee recommended the establish-
ment of a new entity to be called the National Court of Appeals. 9 This
proposed court would screen all certiorari petitions, deny most, and
send on to the Supreme Court several hundred from which the Court
would select its cases. The report was leaked to the press a month
before its official release date, and it provoked an immediate
firestorm of adverse criticism.10 The result was that the report was
stillborn. This episode squelched any further thought about altering
the structure orjurisdiction of the Supreme Court's certiorari process.
As is often said of Social Security, the Court's processes became a
"third rail," politically untouchable. " That is, until now.
The Carrington-Cramton duo has now moved in where for thirty-
six years others have feared to tread.12 Unlike the Freund Committee,
however, their concern is not primarily with the Justices' heavy task of
reviewing certiorari petitions. Rather, their proposal stems from their
perception (hardly novel) that the Court unfortunately has been
transformed into a superlegislature, a role inconsistent with the in-
tended role of a law court, and that this threatens its essential inde-
pendence as well as that of other courts. A major cause, as they see it,
is the Court's complete freedom to decide what it wants to decide.
Their remedy is to reduce this freedom, if not altogether to eliminate
it, and to provide the Court with a sizeable mandatory docket.
8 See generally Warren E. Burger, The Time Is Now for the Intercircuit Panel, 71 A.B.A. J.,
Apr. 1985, at 86.
9 FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE CASELOAD OF THE SU-
PREME COURT (1972).
10 See Arthur John Keeffe, A Mini Supreme Court or a Maxi Appeals Court?, 59 A.B.A.J.,
Feb. 1973, at 182.
11 In 1986, there was a published study of the Justices' certiorari practices, but it did
not touch on the Court's structure or jurisdiction with recommendations for internal
change. SAMUEL ESTREICHER & JOHN SEXTON, REDEFINING THE SUPREME COURT'S ROLE
(1986).
12 This is not their first effort concerning the Supreme Court. In 2006 they proposed
that the Justices' terms be limited to eighteen years, staggered so that a term would expire
every two years, thus giving each president the opportunity to appoint two Justices. ROGER
C. CRAMTON & PAUL D. CARRINGTON, REFORMING THE COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR SUPREME
COURT JUSTICES (Carolina Academic 2006).
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Moreover, Professors Carrington and Cramton implicitly recog-
nize that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve this
through jurisdictional legislation alone. Any effort to define by stat-
ute the types of cases to which the Court would be required to devote
its limited resources would likely be either over-inclusive or under-
inclusive. This reality, among other considerations, led Congress over
the course of the twentieth century to give the Court full discretionary
control over its docket. So, Carrington and Cramton have developed
an imaginative scheme by which to confine the Court to a mandatory
jurisdiction defined annually on a case-by-case basis.
To do this, they would have Congress create a "certiorari division"
within the Supreme Court. It would consist of thirteen United States
circuit judges sitting by assignment for limited terms of years. All cer-
tiorari petitions would come to this division. It would grant approxi-
mately 120 a year and deny all others. Those 120 cases would
constitute the Court's obligatory business. The Court would have no
discretion to decline to decide any, and it would have had no hand in
selecting them, thus restoring it to the position of traditional law
courts.
Among those with long memories in the struggle for judicial im-
provements, the proposal will no doubt bring to mind the much
maligned (at the time) Freund Committee proposal, but with signifi-
cant differences. The similarity is that both proposals place the certio-
rari screening process in hands other than those of the nine Justices.
Thus it is likely to encounter one of the major objections advanced in
opposition to the Freund report, namely, the argument that the Jus-
tices' authority to decide what they will decide cannot be delegated or
placed elsewhere. Justice William Brennan and other influential judi-
cial and legal figures asserted forcefully and unambiguously that the
Court's jurisdiction to decide cases necessarily includes the authority
to choose what cases to decide.13
With respect to the eminence of some of those who made that
argument, it must be said that it is unsupported historically. Allowing
an appellate court discretion to pick and choose what it will decide is
a relatively recent innovation in the Anglo-American legal order.
Eighteenth- and nineteenth-century jurists would have found the con-
cept novel and inconsistent with the role of a court, especially in a
separation-of-powers regime. Giving the Supreme Court Justices dis-
cretion to select their cases is a twentieth-century statutory develop-
ment, an authority conferred by Congress, culminating in the 1988
13 William J. Brennan, Jr., The National Court of Appeals: Another Dissent, 40 U. CHI. L.
REV. 473, 474 (1973).
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Act, 14 which eliminated almost all obligatory jurisdiction. 15 That de-
velopment was endorsed by the Justices, legal scholars, and others; it
met no significant objection. But now Professors Carrington and
Cramton have come forward to point out a serious, unintended conse-
quence, unrecognized in the 1980s. To claim that this discretion is
inherent in and inseparable from the Justices' jurisdiction to decide
cases on their merits is to confuse the familiar with the necessary.
What Congress gives, Congress can take away. Nothing in the Consti-
tution immunizes this statutorily conferred discretion from change by
legislation.
The Court's discretion to deny review to thousands of cases that
come within its jurisdiction annually is also inconsistent with Chief
JusticeJohn Marshall's justification ofjudicial authority. In Marbury v.
Madison,16 he explained that when a case is brought before the Court,
and is within its jurisdiction, the Court must decide the questions nec-
essary to its resolution. The Court, he said, is not free to decline to do
so. Giving the Court discretion to do so, which it currently has, sets it
up for a legislative-type role. As Professors Carrington and Cramton
point out, choosing what issues to decide inescapably involves policy
judgments and ideological views appropriate for legislators but not for
judges on a traditional court of law.
The Freund Committee proposal also met an objection that it
would violate the "one Supreme Court" language of Article 111.17
Whatever the merits of that argument as addressed to the proposed
separate National Court of Appeals, the argument would not appear
to be persuasive here. The Carrington-Cramton proposal does not
vest certiorari screening in another judicial body. Rather, it places it
within a division of the Supreme Court itself. Congress has broad au-
thority to control the structure, personnel, and processes of the Court.
Throughout our history, the Court's Justices and jurisdiction have
been altered legislatively from time to time. Article III expressly
makes the Court's appellate jurisdiction subject to "such Exceptions,
and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.' 8 For de-
cades Congress prohibited many types of cases in the lower federal
courts from being reviewed at all by the Supreme Court.19 If Congress
can shut off review entirely in selected case categories, there would
14 Act ofJune 27, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-352, §§ 1, 2(c), 5(a), 102 Stat. 662, 662-64
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
15 This development is described in Bennett Boskey & Eugene Gressman, The Supreme
Court Bids Farewell to Mandatory Appeals, 121 F.R.D. 81, 97 (1988).
16 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
17 See Eugene Gressman, The National Court of Appeals: A Dissent, 59 A.B.A. J., Mar.
1973, at 253.
18 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
19 Act of Feb. 16, 1875, 18 Stat. 315.
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appear to be no good reason why Congress cannot install a procedure
within the Court to regulate the flow of cases to the Justices. There
would appear to be no constitutional objection to enactment of the
following statute: "The Supreme Court shall consist of nine Justices
and thirteen circuit judges."
Nevertheless, Professors Carrington and Cramton are likely to be
confronted with the same "one Supreme Court" and non-delegation
arguments that confronted Freund. Like all judicial reform propos-
als, this one will encounter instinctive opposition-the human ten-
dency to resist change-and those arguments will provide an aura of
respectability for the opposition. It would be surprising if the nine
Justices did not respond negatively. Power is not relinquished easily.
But the Court ultimately belongs to the people, not to the Justices.
Although their views are to be accorded considerable weight, they
cannot be controlling.
III
There remain, of course, questions as to the wisdom and practical
efficacy of the Carrington-Cramton proposal, questions more useful to
discuss than those of constitutionality. Their proposal appears to have
two objectives: (1) to require the Court to decide a larger number of
"mundane" non-constitutional cases, such as resolving inter-circuit
conflicts, correcting errors in statutory interpretation, and controlling
the administration ofjustice in the lower courts; and (2) to curtail the
"kingly power" of the Court as a superlegislature through which it
makes far-reaching social and political policy.
The first objective rests on the assumption that federal and state
courts-as well as the lawyers-throughout the country need more de-
finitive guidance from the top than they are now getting as to the
mass of non-constitutional business that forms the grist of their every-
day work. That is a relatively non-controversial proposition. The cer-
tiorari division would serve that end by increasing the Court's annual
caseload from about seventy to 120, most of which would be of those
currently neglected non-constitutional cases. As a practical matter,
thirteen circuit judges, one from each circuit, acting collectively
would be in better position to identify such cases than the nine Jus-
tices, isolated as they are in their "Taftian temple." Those appellate
judges sitting all across the country at the intermediate level would, in
effect, serve as representatives of the Supreme Court in the field, spot-
ting issues of real concern that would not be of interest to the Nine in
Washington because of the small caseload they have chosen and their
overriding attraction to more glamorous matters. Drawn from every
circuit, those judges (each with at least ten years experience) would
not only bring geographical diversity to the case selection process, but
[Vol. 94:657
REINING IN THE SUPERLEGISLATURE
they would also bring insights into the full array of federal judicial
business, which varies from one circuit to another. For example, what
the D.C. Circuit adjudicates differs substantially from what the Ninth
Circuit does. Indeed, no two circuits have identical dockets. 20 But all
would be represented in the certiorari granting process. It could be
argued that the proposed certiorari division could supply a valuable
and needed "real world" perspective and body of expert judgment in
enhancing the quality and usefulness of the Supreme Court's work.
Achieving the second objective is more doubtful. While the certi-
orari division might deny review in more of the "hot button" social
cases than the Court now does, it can hardly deny them all. Indeed, it
seems likely that the division over time would grant certiorari in many
of the types of celebrated and controversial cases the Court has been
deciding over the last few decades. Such cases seem to be pressed on
the Court insistently year after year, demanding its attention. The
thirteen circuit judges making up the division can hardly continually
deny them all. Also, it seems likely that when such petitions are
granted the Court will decide those cases in the way that it has been
deciding them unless the Justices move back from the superlegislative
style that the authors decry. However, that will likely come about only
through a gradual change in the Court's membership. In short, the
certiorari division could rein in the amount or degree of superlegisla-
tive activity, but it is difficult to see how it could eliminate it.
In this connection, the authors exhibit ambivalence. It is clear
that they approve of some of the Court's superlegislative decisions
while disapproving of others. They are like the American population
in general. Some of the decisions of this type are applauded by many
people but denounced by others. Results seem to govern public atti-
tude to a high degree. Given this reality, is it possible to agree on a
certiorari policy that would put before the Court only "appropriate"
cases of this type?
With the hope of placing on the Court more of the business of a
law court than that of a superlegislature, Professors Carrington and
Cramton propose that Congress prescribe by statute the criteria under
which the certiorari division is to grant review. But they do not at-
tempt to say what those criteria should or could be, other than to
suggest that priority might be given to inter-circuit conflicts. The stan-
dards for granting certiorari have long been spelled out by the Court
itself in what is now its Rule 10. That rule sets out the "character of
the reasons the Court considers" in deciding whether to grant re-
20 See generally Daniel J. Meador, A Challenge to Judicial Architecture: Modifying the Re-
gional Design of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 603, 614 (1989) (describing
variation in federal appellate dockets).
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view. 21 Although the language of the rule is quite specific, it is gener-
ally recognized that the rule in practice offers little or no tightly-
adhered-to guidance to the Court in passing on certiorari petitions.
Indeed, Justice Byron White repeatedly noted that the Court was de-
nying petitions that presented inter-circuit conflicts, 22 one of the situa-
tions specified in Rule 10 as justifying review. What more can
Congress say? It would be interesting to have the authors draft a sug-
gested statute. It may be that some wording could be developed that
would more precisely constrict the certiorari division to the desired
types of cases, but I am not optimistic. As pointed out earlier, the
inability to define by legislation a meaningful obligatory jurisdiction
led Congress to leave it all to the Justices. But a fresh effort back in
that direction may be worth attempting.
The essence of the Carrington-Cramton proposal is the establish-
ment of a mandatory docket for the Supreme Court, removing discre-
tion from the Justices to choose the cases they will decide. But one
aspect of their proposal is inconsistent with that objective. They
would allow the Court to grant certiorari on a petition that had been
denied by the certiorari division. In addition to undercutting the ba-
sic scheme, that provision would create internal administrative diffi-
culties. If the Justices are left with this discretionary authority, does
this mean that all petitions must be routed to them as well as to the
certiorari division? If so, the plan would not relieve the nine Justices
of the burden they now have of reviewing thousands of petitions an-
nually, and it would ultimately leave them where they are now, with-
out being confined to an obligatory agenda.
If some measure of discretion for the Justices is nevertheless
deemed desirable, this difficulty could be reduced by providing, for
example, that the Justices could grant a petition only where the divi-
sion's decision to deny it had been accompanied by one or more dis-
sents. Under that restriction, the justices need see only those
petitions on which the division's denial had not been unanimous, and
they would have no access to the thousands that had been denied
without dissent. This rule can be justified on the ground that a dis-
sent in the certiorari division shows a reasonable difference of opinion
as to whether the case deserves the Court's attention, thus leaving that
question to the nine Justices.
21 SuP. CT. R. 10.
22 For example, in the 1988, 1989, and 1990 Terms, Justice White dissented on that
ground from the denial of certiorari in 237 cases. See Arthur D. Hellman, Light on a Dar-
kling Plain: Intercircuit Conflicts in the Perspective of Time and Experience, 1998 Sup. CT. REv.
247, 251.
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IV
One might quibble over some other details in this arrangement.
For example, a good argument can be made that the certiorari divi-
sion should function through panels larger than the five-judge panels
that Professors Carrington and Cramton propose. Seven circuit
judges would bring to the case selection process a broader range of
experience with federal appellate business. As mentioned earlier,
dockets among the circuits vary considerably in their makeup. Also,
seven judges would provide a greater range of geographical perspec-
tive than would be afforded by five. Then, too, on a matter as impor-
tant as the setting of the Supreme Court's business, decisions of seven
minds rather than five would carry more weight and likely have a
heightened degree of acceptability.
Whatever the size of the panels, their membership should be con-
tinually shuffled so that the same group of judges is not routinely act-
ing together. As to large intermediate appellate courts, say those with
fifteen or more judges, I have argued that the goals of predictability
and uniformity of decisions are served by having stabilized panels,
each with a defined subject matter jurisdiction. 23 That applies to deci-
sions on the merits at the intermediate level. For determining
whether to grant or deny certiorari, however, there is value in having
the input of the thirteen circuit judges in changing combinations, in
order to get the varying perspectives they have to offer.
Another question concerns the length of term each circuit judge
would serve. As Justice Brennan pointed out in responding to the
Freund Committee report, facility and expertise in passing on certio-
rari petitions are gained with time on the job.2 4 A "feel" for the flow
of cases and the needs of the Supreme Court's docket are acquired
with experience. At least two years may be necessary for this skill to be
developed. This consideration suggests that each judge on the certio-
rari division should serve longer than the three years that Professors
Carrington and Cramton suggest. Perhaps five years would be an ap-
propriate length.
Carrington and Cramton do not address the question of how the
thirteen circuit judges are to be selected, other than to say that one
should come from each circuit. Chief judges might well be omitted
on the ground that they already have a heavy administrative burden.
The assignment in each circuit might rotate on the basis of seniority
of service on the circuit's court of appeals, limited to those with at
least ten years of service.
23 See Daniel J. Meador, An Appellate Court Dilemma and a Solution Through Subject Matter
Organization, 16 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 471 (1983).




These and other details can be worked out. The ultimate ques-
tion put before the country by Professors Carrington and Cramton is
this: would the proper role of the Supreme Court in the American
legal order be better served if the Court were assigned a mandatory
jurisdiction set by thirteen experienced circuit judges, rather than
leaving the nine Justices to choose the cases and issues they would
decide?
There is much to be said for restoring the Court to a mandatory
jurisdiction. Removing the Justices' discretion to choose their cases
would place the Court in the position of a traditional court of law, a
judicial body obliged to resolve disputes brought before it by litigating
parties. The beauty of the Carrington-Cramton proposal is that it
would achieve this end without a statutorily prescribed mandatory ju-
risdiction, which would inevitably be an inexact straitjacket. That,
coupled with a greatly enlarged number of non-constitutional cases,
could diminish the public perception of the Court as a superlegisla-
ture and actually reduce the Court's role as such. This in turn could
lessen the threat to judicial independence. The Justices could no
longer be accused of reaching out to bring before themselves great
socio-political issues on which they wished to impose their views.
It should be remembered that the concept of judicial indepen-
dence took root in the eighteenth century and has been much valued
ever since on the assumption that judges were neutral deciders of dis-
putes, applying known or knowable principles of law. It came to be
recognized that judges through the common law process do in a sense
"make law," but in a limited way, as a by-product of resolving con-
tested issues. As Justice Felix Frankfurter said, judges make law retail,
while legislatures make it wholesale. 25 Once judges start making law
wholesale the justification for their independence vanishes. The pub-
lic then understandably wants them to be politically accountable, like
legislators. That is an unfortunate development, as society needs, and
a legal regime requires, a judicial body of independent judges acting
as neutral deciders under law. If the Carrington-Cramton proposal
can pull the Supreme Court back toward such a law court model it is
to be applauded.
To the extent that they are right in thinking that the Court's cur-
rent mode has a "trickle down" effect, this development could have a
salutary impact on the courts of appeals. Influenced by the Supreme
Court, those intermediate courts have tended to become "mini-su-
25 See Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Hugo Black, quoted in Joseph P. Lash, A Brah-
min of the Law: A Biographical Essay, in FROM THE DIARIES OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 3, 67
(1975).
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preme courts," fascinated with pronouncing on large social and politi-
cal matters while neglecting the mundane work of reviewing district
court judgments for error. Professor Carrington over the years has
been the most persistent and outspoken critic of that transformation,
often seeming to be a "voice crying in the wilderness." 26 State su-
preme courts have likewise evolved toward the superlegislative style,
thus inviting partisan political scrutiny of the worst sort, making con-
tests over judicial seats indistinguishable from elections of legisla-
tors. 27 To a considerable degree judicial independence is lost. The
Supreme Court has contributed to the partisan rancor through its de-
cision preventing states from attempting to moderate inappropriate,
advance position taking by judicial candidates. 28 The popular elec-
tion ofjudges is, of course, the major evil here. Perhaps it is too much
to hope that reigning in the Supreme Court from its superlegislative
style would indirectly reign in the state courts, but such a develop-
ment just might have some beneficial influence.
My conclusions are these:
" At the least, the Carrington-Cramton proposal deserves a full air-
ing before the judiciary committees of the Senate and House of
Representatives. If a consensus emerges, a bill can be developed
within those committees that addresses all the details necessary to
set a certiorari division in place.
* The greatest good that could be expected from such a division
within the Supreme Court would be an increase in its non-consti-
tutional adjudications. Total elimination of the Court's legisla-
tive-type output may be too much to hope, but any reduction of
that role is to be welcomed.
* Little harm should come from giving this arrangement a try. Per-
haps a "sunset" provision should be incorporated, authorizing the
certiorari division to function for seven years. As that period
neared its end, Congress could hold hearings and determine
whether to continue it.
History tells us that any proposed alteration in judicial structure
or jurisdiction faces a prolonged and rarely successful struggle. The
26 See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, The Function of the Civil Appeal: A Late-Century View, 15 S.
C. L. REV. 411 (1987); Paul D. Carrington, The Obsolescence of the United States Courts of Appeals:
Roscoe Pound's Structural Solution, 15 J.L. & POL. 515 (1999); Paul D. Carrington, An Un-
known Court: Appellate Caseload and the "Reckonability" of the Law of the Circuit, in RESTRUCTUR-
ING JUSTICE: THE INNOVATIONS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT AND THE FUTURE OF THE FEDERAL
COURTS 206 (Arthur D. Hellman ed., 1990).
27 Information on the extraordinary amount of money spent in partisan judicial elec-
tions can be found at the Justice at Stake Campaign Home Page, http://www.justiceat
stake.org; National Institute on Money in State Politics Home Page, http://www.fol-
lowthemoney.org; American Judicature Society Home Page, http://www.ajs.org.
28 See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
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Evarts Act,2 9 which established the courts of appeals, came about only
after a quarter-century of wrangling. Of the numerous ideas concern-
ing federal judicial structure advanced over the last forty years only
two have been enacted: the split of the Fifth Circuit in 1981 to create
the Eleventh Circuit 30 and the establishment in 1982 of the Federal
Circuit.3 1 The legal literature and congressional hearing records are
littered with creative and constructive ideas that never went anywhere.
This, however, does not mean that the effort is not worthwhile,
and Carrington and Cramton are to be congratulated for making it. If
the idea is sound, after being tested in the crucible of debate, there is
at least a chance that persistence will eventually pay off.
What is needed, and has been lacking for the last forty years, is
strong congressional leadership. Support for any judicial reform,
however meritorious, is typically thin and fragile. A minimum amount
of opposition can usually block it. Thus its adoption will likely depend
on having at least one influential member of Congress, such as Sena-
tor William Evarts in 1891, who takes the proposal as a major cause
and presses it unrelentingly. Unfortunately, there is little political in-
centive for a member to take on such a cause; rarely is there public
excitement behind such measures. The only motivation is a high-
minded interest in a well-functioning judiciary. Evidence of such in-
terest among members of Congress is not strong, but we should never
give up hope. Then, too, the system needs, and we can be thankful
for having, insightful academics such as Professors Carrington and
Cramton to supply creative ideas for strengthening the independence
of the third branch.
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